Title : The western mode of warfare has changed since the early twentieth century in which ways and why?
By : Aleksandra Lange
Date : 31 Jul 2010
URL : http://www.upublica.com/article_c/article_detail/80/the_western_mode_of_warfare_has_changed_since_the_early_twentieth_century_in_which_ways_and_why
Outline :

This essay was written for the module Key Issues in Contemporary Societies as part of the BSc Sociology course at the London School of Economics.


Introduction

The twentieth century was a dynamic period for the western mode of warfare. It began with the industrialised war, WWI, which was entirely different to previous wars because of the paramount influence industrialisation had over the way war was carried out. Two decades later, WWII burst out in the form of a total war. The total war was a maximised form of the industrialised war in terms of weaponry and strategy. However, a curious period began after WWII: the Cold War. Modern technology was taken to an unprecedented level and it brought the world to a military standstill. Nuclear weapons were too dangerous to be used and hence the strength of the military paradoxically began to diminish. Killing ceased on a large scale and the general public saw body bags in a negative light. Even though the main global arena was paralysed, there was a rise in non-state armed conflicts. They introduced the era of new wars. The new wars have led to a culmination of non-state actors or terrorists fighting against global superpowers in the twenty-first century in what we call the War on Terror.

The reason for such a dramatic shift in the mode of warfare can be divided into two parts. Firstly, the rapid expansion of modern technology and secondly, the role of globalisation. Modern technology developments mostly influenced the mode of warfare between WWI and the Cold War. On the other hand, globalisation gave rise to new wars and the War on Terror, because it increased the number of state-conflicts as a result of forces like migration and the fragmentation of national and cultural identities.

 

Early twentieth century warfare: WWI

Early twentieth century warfare was completely revolutionised by the process of industrialisation. A phenomenon of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, industrialisation fostered the dramatic advance in industrial technology (Kaldor 2001). This consisted of improvements in the quality, production and transportation of weapons, as well as developments in the communication, supply, and organisation of military units (Shaw 2003).

Industrialisation propagated military competition between countries, providing a stimulus to endless innovation (Freedman ed.). On a whole, industrial states had more power in the global arena than non-industrial entities.

The high population growth experienced during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries expanded the size of armies (Freedman ed.). Therefore, in the early twentieth century, there were mass wars between mass armies. From 1914 to 1918, 65 million individuals from 16 states participated in WWI (Browning 2002).  

A combination of the population and industrial boom resulted in the formation of military-industrial complexes. During WWI and WWII, entire economies turned into such developments. They were centres for the mass production of weapons (Shaw 2003) and were ran by worker soldiers who became 'the essential new social actors of modern war' (Shaw 2003 p. 85). Worker soldiers formed a mass disciplined workforce who were deployed to be both soldiers in an army and workers in a factory.

The most significant change in the mode of warfare was the enhancement in weapons' design. Industrialisation replaced the role of the soldier with weaponry as the principal element of warfare. The armaments produced during the period of WWI, such as lighter bullets, the machine gun, poison gas, high explosives, and quick-firing artillery, were much more accurate and sophisticated than previous forms of weaponry (Browning 2002). Lighter bullets increased the effective range of the rifle and could carry more ammunition. Machine guns could fire 600 bullets per minute, which in turn provided close support to the infantry when under attack. The gun's major attribute was its ability to fire continuously for as long as soldiers could feed the belts of ammunition through. Poison gas, such as tear gas and mustard gas, became a major component of the chemical warfare in WWI and later on in WWII. Nonetheless, its killing capacity was limited, because of the development of numerous, successful countermeasures against gas attacks. Furthermore, high explosives, such as TNT and lyddite, enhanced the artillery firepower by at least four times.  Quick-firing artillery was an original invention that ensured that guns automatically returned to their firing position. As a result, this new capacity tripled the rate of artillery (Browning 2002). These new advancements in military technology resulted in an increase in mass killings in relation to previous wars and a rise in the number of skilled soldiers (Shaw 2003).

Besides weaponry developments there were non-military inventions that changed the way warfare was conducted. Motor vehicles (1889) and aircraft (1903) increased the ability to travel, whereas the telephone (1884) and radio (1901) improved the ability to communicate (Browning 2002). Through the improvements in communications, governments, generals, and armies on the battlefield could coordinate more efficiently.

Along with the development in weaponry, there was an improvement in tactics. Mass-produced artillery became more sophisticated, because it applied new courses of action, such as flash-spotting, sound-ranging, aerial photography, and complex radio communications (Browning 2002). This new unregistered artillery fire made the act of surprise possible; therefore, the infantry began to specialise in trench warfare attack (Browning 2002). Soldiers would find weak parts in the enemy's lines and then they would use small groups, comprised of storm troopers, to overtake the enemy's holdings (Browning 2002). Moreover, the twentieth century saw an end to the use of cavalry in warfare and increasing limitations to single leadership. No military leader of the top ranks was assigned as the official general, because a single general would lack the means to control and command mass armies (Browning 2002).

 

 

Early twentieth century warfare: WWII

In contrast to the industrialised form that characterised WWI, WWII was a total war. In the words of Roger Chickering, total war '...is distinguished by its unprecedented intensity and extent. Theatres of war span the globe; the scale of battle is practically limitless' (Browning 2002 p. 179). Similarly to the Cold War and the contemporary War on Terror, it was a war waged against evil (Kaldor 2001). Since it was a total war, entire populations were affected, especially civilians: 'WWII was the first major war of modern times that killed more civilians than soldiers' (Browning 2002 p. 178). The most striking examples of the influence of war on civilians were the deadly bombings in Hiroshima, Dresden, and Coventry.

The mass production of weaponry in WWI was further maximised during WWII. It became increasingly complex as knowledge of physics and chemistry was incorporated more and more into the technological developments (Browning 2002). Tanks that were to some extent used in WWI were improved in terms of speed, the depth of armour, and the power of weaponry. In the radio communications sphere, signals intelligence was introduced. As a follow-up from the invention of machine guns, self-propelled guns began to be employed in armies (Browning 2002).

In the context of transportation, armoured personnel carriers, armoured cars, motorcycles, and trucks were gradually more utilized in warfare (Browning 2002).

Germany during WWII introduced a new warfare strategy, which was called Blitzkrieg (Browning 2002). It was based on impulse warfare: it concentrated its military forces and accordingly enveloped the enemy. This was a strategy that aimed at totally defeating the enemy. However, it was not successful in the long term, and therefore, it did not provide Germany with victory in the end.  

The total war resulted with the erosion of the civil-military distinction. This was the continuation of the involvement of whole societies in the logistical chain supplying the fighting of war in WWI (Shaw 2003). As a consequence, all citizens became involved in the war, because states wanted to maximise the power of their armies. Both in WWI and WWII, arms industries and the supportive civilian populations formed the Home Front (Shaw 2003). Foreign armies attacked the Home Front, because it was seen as the domestic supplier of war. To put it briefly, the total war was an ultimate fusion of war, state, and society (Kaldor 2001).

 

Cold War

As a consequence of unlimited trust in and dependence on modern technology, the world came to a military standstill during the Cold War (Townshend 2000). Modern technology developed to a point where the most dangerous weapon was in the form of nuclear arms. The Cold War consisted of an ongoing nuclear arms race between a hegemony of super-powers. The central super-powers were involved with other countries in a total network of large military alliances (Kaldor 2001).

Similarly to WWI and WWII, the Cold War was a global affair; however, overall it was not based on killing, but on technological tension between states.  According to Mary Kaldor, the Cold War was an 'imaginary war' (Shaw 2003) and contrary to popular belief, nuclear arms made the military less powerful than it ever was. 'Given the potentially disastrous consequences of nuclear power, strategy became increasingly concerned with the balance and political meaning of weaponry, rather than its physical use' (Shaw 2003 p. 91). In fact, the US nuclear arsenal was never used against enemies (Shaw 2003).

Nuclear weapons were based on 'a race towards greater and greater power' (Townshend 2000 p. 342). On the 6th of August 1945, the first atomic bomb, which carried 14,000 tonnes of TNT, exploded over Hiroshima. It was a thousand times as powerful as any previous weapon used in modern warfare.  In contrast, in 1961 the USSR developed an atomic bomb that contained 58,000,000 tonnes of TNT. Modern technology was developing military mode of warfare at an extremely rapid pace (Townshend 2000). Nonetheless, 'in the case of an all-out nuclear war, there would be neither victory nor economic and demographic recovery... The number of occasions when one side or another threatened the use of nuclear weapons gradually declined' (Townshend 2000 p. 343). Therefore, in 1980 the states settled on an agreement to notify each other of any large-scale manoeuvres and to dismantle certain weapons. Finally in 1985, the Cold War came to an end - nuclear disarmament began its course. However, some countries still continued to expand their nuclear capacities. During the early 1990s, the world's third largest nuclear arsenal was located in China (Townshend 2000). Nonetheless, military history was reversed by the introduction of nuclear weapons: 'in every region where they have been introduced, large-scale, interstate war has as good as disappeared' (Townshend 2000 p. 349).

Besides nuclear weapons, other high technology weapons were developed from the end of WWII. Existing weapons became more powerful and larger. New inventions such as helicopters and missiles were produced. Electronic circuitry, such as electronic sensors and laser rangefinders, became an essential element of warfare. Computer systems became crucial to war strategy as well, because they enabled pinpoint targeting through the aid of cruise missiles (Townshend 2000).

In contrast to early twentieth century warfare, there were no battles of mass armies, because of a change in the types of fighting units (Freedman ed.). The maximisation of technology and therefore the change in the mode of warfare changed functions of the military organisation. States had smaller regular armies with a greater dependence on reserve forces. The educational base of soldiers was broadened in order for the army to be prepared for any type of military event (high intensity conflict, low intensity conflict, peace-keeping missions). On the contrary, in the early twentieth century, armies had a small core of professional soldiers and a not much differentiated manpower, which was purely military in its structure. In contrast, the modern army is very differentiated and uses very sophisticated technologies. Skill structures are becoming more similar to those of civilian institutions (Freedman ed.).

Nevertheless, the fundamental division of labour within the army and the nature of strategy did not change. The distinction between army, navy, and air force was firmly maintained (Townshend 2000). Similarly to warfare strategy described in WWI, armies would gain the high ground by launching an air strike against the enemy's air force and its anti-aircraft defences. This way it would disrupt the enemy's mobilization and ability to manoeuvre. Then it would find a weakness in the enemy's line and would push its forces deep into the enemy's rear in order to cut off his primary supplies (Townshend 2000).  

In addition, to the avoidance of mass army battles, the general public believed in the protection of life of its own soldiers. 'Body bags were a real electoral danger' (Shaw 2003 p. 91). The reason for this development is that the brutal mode of warfare experienced in WWI and WWII was ethically traumatic for society.

 

New Wars

During the Cold War and the twenty-first century, new wars have become the main mode of warfare. 'Over the period (of the Cold War) as a whole, out of perhaps 100 armed conflicts fought all over the world, over three-quarters of them were fought by political entities which were not states' (Townshend 2000 p. 355). These wars were not fought by armies but by military organisations, which on the most part did not use modern weapons and weapon systems created by the nuclear arms race of the Cold War (Townshend 2000).

New wars are characterised by inter-ethnic competition, privatised violence, and informal soldiering among others.

Inter-ethnic competition lies at the root of civil wars. Inter-ethnic competition has been sparked by the modern forces of globalisation. Globalisation has brought about a wave of migration, a fragmentation of states and identities, and in some cases a fight for the preservation of national and cultural feelings. Military leaders mobilise the excluded and abandoned parts of society and fight in the name of their ideology (Kaldor 2001).

New wars are also defined through privatised violence, which is violence carried out for private gain. Soldiers are not paid in many areas of the world (Shaw 2003); therefore, military indiscipline occurs in the form of pillaging and looting (Kaldor 2001).

  Moreover, military organisations are defined by informal soldiering. In other words, they consist of militias, paramilitaries, remnants of state armies, and self-defence groups (Kaldor 2001). This is where the concept of guerrilla warfare comes into play. Guerrilla wars are conflicts in which hostilities are conducted by smaller groups of combatants, such as militias and self-defence groups (McLeod 2004). Wars such as partisan struggle, insurrection, and revolution are all a form of the guerrilla war (McLeod 2004). The strategy of guerrilla wars is based on the harassment of the enemy, avoidance of any decisive battles, destruction of enemy communications, and the tactical use of surprise and confusion. Their main advantages are their high degree of mobility and their good relations with the local population. Their central disadvantage is their lack of military strength; however, guerrilla freedom fighters use surplus weapons remaining from the Cold War (Kaldor 2001).

The entire concept of the guerrilla war was fully defined by Mao Zedong in the mid-twentieth century (McLeod 2004). Two contemporary examples of guerrilla wars are the conflicts in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s as well as in Bosnia during the 1990s.

Modern, heavy weapons and weapon systems are unsuited to combat guerrilla warfare, because firstly most wars take place in areas without infrastructure. In order to function in such an area, armies would have to create weapon systems and defend them. This would be financially and logistically difficult (Townshend 2000). Secondly, it is trivial to discriminate between people you want to preserve and to eliminate in a zone of guerrilla warfare. The only safe approach would be to use precision-guided missiles, however, these weapons are too expensive (Townshend 2000). Considering these facts, it is not surprising that contemporary zones of peace are characterised by areas with high levels of infrastructure (Kaldor 2001).     

Overall, the new war economy is based on the fragmentation of states, which has led to globalised wars, little domestic production, low participation, and the increased targeting of civilians (Kaldor 2001).

 

War on Terror

During the twenty-first century, we are faced with a new type of warfare all together - the War on Terror. Warfare has continued to evolve into the new millennium and 'its moral dimensions we now have to cope with the deliberate regression towards barbaric terrorism' (Coker 2008 p. 1). The first military assumption is that two states battle for a recognised political end where there is room for negotiation and compromise (Coker 2008). This has changed since 2001, because 'the enemies we now face are largely non-state actors' (Coker 2008 p. 2). Many of these non-state actors are not governed by the same rules as most states. Therefore, it is human to see them as distinctly evil (Coker 2008). Consequently, the mode of warfare has to be altered to counteract the new enemy. This persuades us to battle terror with terror. 'We are dealing with leaders who are not willing to abide by those etiquettes of war which most states, with only a few exceptions, have chosen to recognise for centuries or more' (Coker 2008 p. 5). Terrorist movements have not ratified the Geneva Conventions. This poses us with a moral and ethical dilemma that is difficult to resolve: should we change our legal justification for going to war, our humanity in targeting, and our proportionality in response? (Coker 2008)

The newly elected president of the United States, Barack Obama, has his own answer to this dilemma. He believes that 'the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War' (BBC News 2009) and that the global nuclear stockpile should be severely reduced.  He believes that the most extreme threat to global security is 'the possibility of terrorists possessing nuclear weapons' (BBC News 2009). Barack Obama stated that 'one terrorist with a nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction' (BBC News 2009). Could this be the beginning to a fully peaceful, nuclear-free world?

 

Conclusion

The course of twentieth century warfare was mainly determined by the revolutionary, technological innovations, which altered the scale of killing and worldwide attitudes to war. On the other hand, globalisation shifted the focus from large scale, national wars to more localised, interethnic wars. The main question facing us today is what will happen to the mode of warfare in the decades to come. In my opinion, one of the three following concepts will dictate its course: media and communications, income inequalities, or natural resources. The role of global communication networks is increasing at a rapid pace. This might signify that the new wars will continue to be the dominating forms of war worldwide. On the other hand, income inequalities are rising with the global domination of capitalism. War might shift its focus from interethnic competition to the rich and poor. Lastly, with the rise of new superpowers, such as China and Brazil, as well as the ever-increasing desire for economic growth, the fight for natural resources might become the dominating factor. In whichever direction the world's affairs follow, we can be sure that the expansion of technology and the dominance of globalisation in the twentieth century will have lasting influences on the mode of warfare.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Bibliography

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Bibliography

 

BBC News (05.04.2009) Obama promotes nuclear-free world.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7983963.stm, 12.04.2009.

Browning, P. (2002) The Changing Nature of Warfare: The Development of Land Warfare from 1972 to 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coker, C. (2008) Ethics and War in the 21st Century. Oxon: Routledge.

Freedman, L. [ed.] War. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaldor, M. (2001) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

McLeod, AJ. (2004) Chapter III Guerrilla warfare as a global concern. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-09202004-064844/unrestricted/03chapter3.pdf, 10.04.2009.

Shaw, M. (2003) War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity.

Shaw, M. [ed.] (1991) War, State and Society. London: Macmillan.

Townshend, C. (2000) The Oxford History of Modern War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

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