"Peace is not so nice as you think; it is generated by violence; it embodies violence; and it in turn generates violence." Discuss.

The case of Northern Ireland mirrors the situation in Rwanda in terms of its full cycle of indirect and direct violence, and its inbuilt structural violence.

Centuries of oppression by protestant English colonists led to ingrained social inequality concretely displayed in discrimination against Catholics in employment, education, housing and local elections. This could only lead to extreme frustration amongst a large part of the population.

As Cairns and Derby have identified, “[i]f one finds oneself as a member of a group from which it is difficult or impossible to leave, the only way to enhance self-esteem is to act to preserve or defend the group’s interests” (Cairns and Derby 1998, 756) – hence the post-1969 catholic civil rights claims that led to actual violence and the deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland.

What is interesting about the Irish case is that attempts were made subsequent to this violence to address these issues of inequality, which brought about an end to electoral manipulation and inequitable housing provision, and the introduction of fair employment policies and equal access to higher education.

As opposed to Rwanda’s 1993 Arusha peace accords that excluded certain popular but extreme political groups from the negotiation table [1], the peace process leading to the 1998 British-Irish Good Friday Agreement was inclusive and representative of all parties, even the hardliners, and has thus proved more successful. Ireland has also seen the introduction of a long-term strategy of anti-discrimination education aimed at young people, to discourage a repeat of similar frustrations in the future.

Often, however, the very processes that are designed to bring about peace themselves engender violence, both in direct and indirect form.

It can reasonably be argued that the 1993 Oslo peace accords between Israel and Palestine ultimately failed to deliver peace because not all Palestinian parties had a voice in the negotiations. Rather, as Rubin clarifies, the “agreement itself had been made possible only because Arafat acted…autonomously” (Rubin 1999, 5).

Without the kind of policy of inclusive representation during the negotiations that was seen in Ireland, the Palestinians’ aspirations of self-determination were bypassed: the terms of the peace agreement did not address the fundamental issues.

Despite Said’s lengthy one-sided diatribe against Israel and the US, it is clear from his conclusions regarding the 1993 negotiation that the peace accords did not bring an end to violence. Instead, he notes, the Oslo Agreement brought greater long-term suffering for both Palestinians and Israelis, particularly because the solutions specified were only interim.

“That the peace under which Palestinians suffer and are forced to lose hope… might be an undesirable state, which in fact may drive some people to suicidal violence as an alternative, is never considered.” (Said 1995, 148)

Having been stripped of their voice during negotiations, the Palestinian majority were arguably left with no alternative but to continue the violence that attracts attention to their cause, and might eventually lead to more successful peace talks.

In order to succeed, a peace process must allow all to have a voice and must address grievances; this might be achieved through the criminal justice system or truth commissions.

However, in countries where structural violence is deep-seated the judicial system may prove unable to prosecute perpetrators due to corruption and lack of political will, as has been the case in Colombia and Guatemala. Those involved in prosecution are at risk, discouraging justice altogether and thereby encouraging ongoing violence (Hayner 2001).